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Using a naturalistic video database, we examined whether gestures scaffold the symbolic
development of a language-enculturated chimpanzee, a language-enculturated bonobo, and
a human child during the second year of life. These three species constitute a complete
clade: species possessing a common immediate ancestor. A basic finding was the func-
tional and formal similarity of many gestures between chimpanzee, bonobo, and human
child. The child’s symbols were spoken words; the apes’ symbols were lexigrams – non-
iconic visual signifiers. A developmental pattern in which gestural representation of a
referent preceded symbolic representation of the same referent appeared in all three
species (but was statistically significant only for the child). Nonetheless, across species,
the ratio of symbol to gesture increased significantly with age. But even though their sym-
bol production increased, the apes continued to communicate more frequently by gesture
than by symbol. In contrast, by 15–18 months of age, the child used symbols more fre-
quently than gestures.This ontogenetic sequence from gesture to symbol, present across
the clade but more pronounced in child than ape, provides support for the role of gesture
in language evolution. In all three species, the overwhelming majority of gestures were
communicative (i.e., paired with eye contact, vocalization, and/or persistence). However,
vocalization was rare for the apes, but accompanied the majority of the child’s commu-
nicative gestures.This species difference suggests the co-evolution of speech and gesture
after the evolutionary divergence of the hominid line. Multimodal expressions of commu-
nicative intent (e.g., vocalization plus persistence) were normative for the child, but less
common for the apes. This species difference suggests that multimodal expression of
communicative intent was also strengthened after hominids diverged from apes.
Keywords: gestural theory of language evolution, language-enculturated apes, symbolic development, cross-
species comparisons, gesture, communication development, language development
INTRODUCTION
The idea that language evolved from a primarily gestural mode
of communication is centuries old (Condillac, 1746; Hewes, 1973,
1976; Corballis, 2002, 2009). Evidence that may support a ges-
tural origin of language includes the relatively early emergence of
bipedalism (freeing up the hands to gesture), the possibility that
modern hand configurations arose much earlier than the modern
vocal tract, the variability, and flexibility of non-human primates’
gestural abilities relative to their vocal communication, evidence of
shared neural substrates for manual action and language, and the
finding that chimpanzees exhibit enhanced laterality in commu-
nicative gesture relative to other types of action (Greenfield, 1991,
2008; Lieberman, 1998; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; Corballis, 2002;
Hopkins et al., 2005; Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2006; Armstrong and
Wilcox, 2007; Armstrong, 2008).
Because behaviors such as language and gesture do not fossilize,
evolutionary links between gesture and language are impossible to
prove. However, there is strong evidence in favor of an ontogenetic
relationship between gesture and language. Gestures may allow
infants to refer to objects before mastering their names and to
gain input about relations between words and objects (see Iverson
and Goldin-Meadow, 2005 for a discussion of this). Deictic ges-
tures (referring to an object or location) allow reference to grow
from the immediate context toward abstraction by helping infants
understand the link between symbols and referents (Werner and
Kaplan, 1984/1963; Zukow-Goldring, 1996; de Villiers Rader and
Zukow-Goldring, 2010). Deictic gestures are more common than
words early in development and predict linguistic development in
both typical and atypical human populations across many cultures
(Bates et al., 1975; Caselli, 1983; Caselli and Volterra, 1990; Goldin-
Meadow and Morford, 1994; McGregor and Capone, 2001; Iverson
and Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Rowe et al., 2008).
Children typically begin using gestures several months before
they begin using words (Goldin-Meadow and Morford, 1994).
Indeed, words typically become more common than gestures
within the second year of life (Iverson et al., 1994; Iverson and
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Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Pizzuto and Capobianco, 2007). Even as
gestures decline in importance in one-element communications,
they remain important as part of two-element combinations
(Greenfield and Smith, 1976; Capirci and Volterra, 2008). Gesture-
symbol combinations precede the development of symbol-symbol
combinations in both language-enculturated apes and human
children (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 2005; Greenfield et al.,
2008). Thus, gestures seem to provide a foundation for each new
stage in early linguistic development.
Focusing on objects that were referred to in one modality
before appearing in another modality at a later observation,
Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (2005) found that 10–24-month
old infants first referred to objects with communicative gestures
before speech more often than with speech before gesture. Our
goal in the present study was to see if this gestural scaffold-
ing of specific vocabulary items would hold across the clade of
human, chimpanzee, and bonobo – under similar conditions of
a language-enriched environment. The method of Iverson and
Goldin-Meadow (2005) was highly suitable for our purpose: to
examine the role of gesture in the ontogeny of symbol use across
the clade.
ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY IN EARLY COMMUNICATION
DEVELOPMENT
More generally, we hypothesized that all three species would
exhibit a shift from greater reliance on gestures to greater reliance
on symbolic communication with development. Such evidence
would support the gestural theory of the evolution of language.
Because evolution is a series of ontogenetic sequences, with ear-
lier stages, more preserved in evolutionary history than later ones,
cross-species similarities in early developmental sequences provide
relevant evidence for reconstructing phylogenetic history (Parker
and McKinney, 1999).
The logic of cladistic analysis is such that traits found across an
entire clade (defined as species with a common immediate ances-
tor) are likely to have existed in the common ancestor (Parker
and McKinney, 1999). Hence, another basic type of evidence for
the gestural theory of language evolution would be similarities in
the function and form of gestures across the clade. Using video
data, we therefore describe and compare the different types of ges-
ture in bonobo, chimpanzee, and human at comparable stages of
communicative development. This is the first time such data has
been available to compare the role of gesture in communicative
development across the clade.
COMPARING GESTURE ACROSS SPECIES
One of the primary challenges in comparing gestures across species
is that definitions of gesture vary across studies. Gesture has been
defined as specifically as communicative movements of the hands
and as broadly as any visible bodily action (Kendon, 2000, 2004;
Wilkins, 2003; Crais et al., 2004; Liebal et al., 2004; Müller, 2007;
Pika, 2008). In the present study, we were open to communica-
tive gesture involving body parts other than the hand. In addition,
we operationalized communicative intention as separate from the
gestural action itself. Perhaps most important, we utilized the same
operational definition of gesture across all three species, a major
methodological advance for the comparative study of gesture.
Defining communicative intention
Varying definitions of communicative intention, or evidence that a
gesture was emitted in order to influence another, also complicate
cross-species comparisons of gestures. Communicative intention
is often indexed by the presence of attention-getting behaviors
(such as vocalization), monitoring the attentional state of the
addressee (e.g., gaze alternation between addressee and referent),
or persistence in maintaining a gesture until a response is elicited
(Bates et al., 1975; Bard, 1992; Krause and Fouts, 1997; Leavens
and Hopkins, 1999).
Captive bonobos, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans dis-
play clear evidence of communicative intention, or monitoring
the attentional states of others, while gesturing. For example,
they more frequently use purely visual gestures when their audi-
ence is facing them and communicate with vocalizations more
when their audience is facing away (Tomasello et al., 1997b;
Hostetter et al., 2001; Pika et al., 2005; Liebal et al., 2006; Genty
et al., 2009). Two signing chimpanzees acquired the attention of
their caregivers before gesturing and also exhibited gaze alter-
nation between addressee and referent while gesturing (Krause
and Fouts, 1997). Captive adult chimpanzees and orangutans also
engage in gestural persistence when their communicative needs
are not met (Leavens et al., 2005; Cartmill and Byrne, 2007). Thus,
both non-language-enculturated apes in captivity and language-
enculturated apes show evidence of communicative intent by
monitoring the attentional state of others.
Although many studies of human development use eye contact
to infer that a gesture is communicative, the majority of gestures
produced by humans between 12 and 21 months of age may not co-
occur with eye contact (Blake et al., 1992). Tactile contact may serve
the same function as visual monitoring (Leung and Rheingold,
1981). Thus, some researchers of human gestural development
require only that a gesture be directed toward another for it to
be considered communicative, rather than specifying eye contact
as a criterion (Crais et al., 2004). In order to be consistent with
previous work examining ape gestures, we defined communica-
tive intent for the purposes of the analyses reported in this paper
in terms of persistence, attention eliciting behaviors (e.g., vocal-
ization), or monitoring behaviors (e.g., eye contact) (Leavens and
Hopkins, 1999).
Previous research comparing human infants to captive apes
(at a mean age of 18 years) and language-enculturated adult apes
revealed that apes exhibit more eye contact when gesturing than
human infants do (see Leavens and Hopkins, 1999 for a review).
In contrast, both captive and language-enculturated apes pair ges-
tures with vocalizations less frequently than do human infants (see
Leavens and Hopkins, 1999 for a review). Based on these findings,
we hypothesized that the bonobo and chimpanzee would more fre-
quently use eye contact to indicate communicative intent, whereas
the child would more frequently use vocalizations to do so. This
difference could be a key to the evolution of vocal language in
humans, but not apes, after the split between Homo and Pan five
to six million years ago.
Types of gestures
Unlike pre-linguistic children, apes who are not language-
enculturated produce primarily dyadic (referring to the recipient
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of the gesture) rather than triadic (indicating a third entity) ges-
tures (Camaioni, 1997; Pika et al., 2005; Pika, 2008). However,
pointing to objects has been observed among captive apes (Leav-
ens and Hopkins, 1999), language-enculturated apes (Miles, 1990;
Call and Tomasello, 1994; Brakke and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1996;
Krause and Fouts, 1997; Leavens and Hopkins, 1999; Tanner et al.,
2006), and apes in the wild (Inoue-Nakamura and Matsuzawa,
1997; Vea and Sabater-Pi, 1998). Pointing with the index finger is
relatively infrequently observed among captive or wild apes who
have not been language-enculturated, but whole hand pointing (or
indicative reaching) is commonly demonstrated by captive apes
when they have a receptive audience (Call and Tomasello, 1994;
Leavens and Hopkins, 1999).
Language-enculturated adult apes may exhibit more pointing
with the index finger relative to reaching gestures than both cap-
tive apes (at a mean age of 18 years) and human infants younger
than 19 months of age (Leavens and Hopkins, 1999). Thus, being
raised in a linguistically enriched environment may facilitate the
emergence of pointing across ape species (Miles, 1990; Brakke and
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1996; Krause and Fouts, 1997; Tanner et al.,
2006). Indeed, a language-trained orangutan exhibited more flex-
ible pointing and better understanding of human points than
a captive orangutan who had been trained to point (Call and
Tomasello, 1994; Tomasello et al., 1997a). An emergent relation-
ship between symbol training and pointing has even been observed
among dolphins. Dolphins trained for 6 months to communicate
with an underwater symbol communication board spontaneously
began to exhibit pointing behaviors with associated gaze mon-
itoring in the presence of human trainers (Xitco et al., 2001).
And two dolphins who had been in a language-training pro-
gram for over 15 years both showed complex understanding of
human pointing behaviors (Herman et al., 1999; Pack and Her-
man, 2007). These findings indicate both the importance of the
social environment for the emergence of communicative potential
and the developmental connection between symbolic and gestural
communication.
However, pointing increases with age for human infants
(Locke et al., 1990; Franco and Butterworth, 1996; Masa-
taka, 2007). Because pointing could also increase over age for
language-enculturated apes, it is important to compare language-
enculturated apes and humans when both are at early stages of
development, as we do in the present study. Indeed, it is quite pos-
sible that pointing occurs less frequently for younger apes than for
older ones, as is the case for children.
There is also evidence that young language-enculturated apes
use their lexigrams (non-iconic visual signifiers) to request more
often than to indicate (Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1990;
Lyn et al., 2011). Reaching is a gesture that often signifies request,
whereas pointing is a gesture that often signifies indication. Young
children do not show an increase in the frequency of commu-
nicative reaching over the second year of life (Franco and Butter-
worth, 1996). Given all of these facts, one might expect that the
child would point relatively more than the young apes and reach
relatively less.
Tomasello (2006) theorizes that apes, unlike year-old children,
are not motivated to share experience with others for its own
sake. Of all gestures, the gesture of holding up an object to show
another is perhaps the most unambiguous example of social shar-
ing for its own sake. In support of his point, Tomasello notes that,
around 12 months of age, infants hold up objects to show to oth-
ers, whereas apes do not. However, a comparative study of showing
gestures in a chimpanzee, bonobo, and child is required to empir-




A chimpanzee, a bonobo, and a human child participated in the
current study. The ape participants were Panpanzee, a female
chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), and Panbanisha, a female bonobo
(Pan paniscus), who was 6 weeks older than Panpanzee. These
apes were reared together at the Language Research Center in
Atlanta, Georgia in a language enriched environment where they
learned to communicate with their caregivers using gestures,vocal-
izations, and lexigrams (arbitrary visual symbols representing
words). The language enriched environment included ongoing
activities wherein caregivers and apes communicated through ges-
tures, lexigrams, and vocalizations, as well as daily language-testing
sessions (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993). The caregivers also com-
municated via English speech. As with human children, lexigram
symbols were learned within the context of ongoing activities that
were relevant to the apes (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993, 1998;
Brakke and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1996).
Inter-individual routines consisted of play and exploration
both within the apes’ living space and while foraging through the
forest outside their home. While the same lexigrams were avail-
able both inside and outdoors, the lexigram boards used while
exploring the woods were plastic covered printed sheets, while
the keyboards inside were electronic. When a lexigram on one
of these inside boards was pressed, an electronic voice spoke
the word that lexigram represented. Lexigram boards used dur-
ing exploration were designed to be highly portable and did
not emit words when pressed. In order to capture all possible
communication on video, caregivers spoke the word for each lexi-
gram touched on the more portable lexigram boards. The apes
understand human speech and often respond to a caregiver’s
speech through lexigrams and/or gestures (Savage-Rumbaugh
et al., 1993).
The human participant in this study was a typically developing
girl, GN, who was reared by her middle-class parents in a typi-
cal European-American linguistic environment. The observations
were done at home in naturally occurring situations, usually, but
not always, indoors.
DATA SOURCES
Video data of the bonobo, Panbanisha, and the chimpanzee, Pan-
panzee, were recorded from soon after birth until Panpanzee was
moved to a new location when she was 3 years and 11 months of
age. Biweekly or monthly recordings of varying length were con-
ducted until the apes were 26 months of age; subsequent record-
ings occurred every few months. Monthly hour-long videos of the
child, GN, were recorded from 8.5 months of age till almost 2 years
of age. In a few instances, it was necessary to return a second day to
complete the hour for a particular month. In each case, the video
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was naturalistic; there was no attempt to make the settings across
species more similar than they actually were.
Following the methods of Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (2005)
as closely as possible, we wished to examine communication
between the onset of one element and two-element symbol
production. Based on the communicative level observed in the
recordings and the availability of usable data, we selected approx-
imately two half-hour sessions each month for the chimpanzee
and bonobo from 12 to 26 months of age and an hour per month
from 11 to 18 months of age for the child. After accounting for
variations in the quantity of usable data available for each partici-
pant across the specified age range, approximately 14–15 h of video
were coded for the bonobo and chimpanzee respectively while 8 h
of video were coded for the child.
While the bonobo, Panbanisha, first used lexigrams commu-
nicatively at 11 months of age, the chimpanzee, Panpanzee, began
lexigram use at 13 months of age (Brakke and Savage-Rumbaugh,
1996). However, usable video data was only available for both apes
beginning at 12 months of age. We identified the onset of one-word
speech for the child, GN, by viewing backwards from 12 months
of age until a video was identified wherein the child did not utter a
word, at 10 months of age. Thus, the onset of data analysis for each
participant was the following: bonobo at 12 months of age, chim-
panzee at 12 months of age, and the human child at 11 months
of age.
As in Iverson and Golden-Meadow’s study, the offset of data
analyses for the child coincided with clear evidence of multiword
speech operationalized as five occurrences of different word com-
binations (18 months). Because the apes combined lexigrams less
frequently than the child combined words and continued to use
mainly single words throughout the study, the offset of ape data
analysis was determined by the availability of usable data. After
26 months of age, no videos were available of the chimpanzee,
Panpanzee, until she was 30 months of age. Thus, data analysis was
terminated at 26 months of age for both apes. Generally, videos
focused on only one ape at a time. When videos included both
apes engaging in activities with one another, the video could be
coded for either ape as long as the ape was visible for the major-
ity of the sampled video. GN’s data captured daily interactions
at home and in her backyard in various contexts (such as eat-
ing breakfast, celebrating a birthday, playing with dolls, etc.) to
give a reflection of normal daily interactions with her parents
and other people. The environment in which the child was filmed
more closely approximated the environment of participants in the
Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (2005) study than did the apes’ envi-
ronment, in that the apes spent a far greater proportion of their
time exploring a large outdoor area with a much larger number of
possible referents than are available in a home.
GESTURE CODING SCHEMES
Coding schemes for both apes and the child were developed based
on methods developed by Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (2005).
Two types of communication were coded: (1) gestures and (2)
lexigrams or speech.
Lexigram use (for the apes) was defined as touching a lexigram
while the referent was glossed by caregiver or electronic voice on
the lexigram board (see Figure 1). Speech (for the child) was coded
only if directly interpreted or responded to by a caregiver to make
coding of speech as similar as possible to coding of lexigrams.
Gestures were coded according to their form into one of the
following categories: reach, reach-touch, point, point-touch, up,
head-point. Other gestures exhibited by only one species will be
discussed in the next paragraph. Reach involved actively extending
a limb without contacting a referent (see Figure 2). Reach-touch
was the same as reach except that contact was made with the refer-
ent, but only after a response from the caregiver (see Figure 3). We
required that the caregiver respond before the ape contacted the
object in order to distinguish between reaches that were direct
actions upon an object and reaches that were gestures requir-
ing a response from another in order to allow action upon an
object.
Point involved extending an arm with the index finger extended
toward an object without touching it (see Figure 4). Point-touch
began as a point but the participant ended the point by touching
the referent without moving her finger along it or manipulat-
ing it (see Figure 5). Unlike reach-touch, we did not require a
caregiver response in order for point-touch to be considered a ges-
ture because point-touches often occurred in relation to objects
that the child or ape could touch without a caregiver response.
We distinguished between point-touches as gestures and touch-
ing something with the index finger as an exploratory action
by requiring that point-touches not involve manipulation of the
object. Head-point, indicating an object by using one’s head (see
Figure 6), was observed once from the child and once from the
bonobo. Up involved raising the arm/arms above the head with
the implied intention of being picked up (see Figure 7).
Other gestures were exhibited by the child, but not the apes;
these included show, head shake, nod, open, wave, and shhh. Show
involved holding an object into the line of gaze of another while
looking toward the person’s face without subsequently giving the
object to the other. Head shake involved shaking the head from
side to side. Nod involved moving the head up and down. Open
involved moving a partially curled hand back and forth while
reaching toward a door knob. Wave involved moving an open hand
back and forth while looking at another person. Shhh involved
holding a finger to pursed lips.
Still others were exhibited only by the chimpanzee. Only the
chimpanzee was observed to once exhibit a give gesture, or out-
stretched palm without attempting to grab an object. The chim-
panzee was also the only participant to use guide hand gestures
wherein she moved the caregiver’s hand into a reaching position.
The bonobo was alone in exhibiting no unique gestures.
When gestures were deictic, they were also assigned a likely
referent. Two clues to reference were used: the caregiver’s behav-
ioral or verbal response to the gesture and the object or person
which the gesture pointed toward. Gestures that involved reach-
ing or pointing into the distance with no visible referent with the
likely intention of causing motion in the indicated direction were
interpreted as meaning go (see Figure 8). Gestures that involved
reaching or pointing toward the ground with the likely intention
of being lowered to the ground were interpreted as meaning down.
Each gesture and lexigram was also coded as either communica-
tive or non-communicative. Communicative gestures or lexigrams
possessed at least one of the following properties: persistence,
Frontiers in Psychology | Comparative Psychology June 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 160 | 4
Gillespie-Lynch et al. Cross-species study of gesture
FIGURE 1 | An example of a lexigram use (top) and an image of lexigram board (bottom). Lexigram use was defined as touching a lexigram while the
referent was glossed by caregiver or electronic voice on lexigram board.
eye contact, or vocalization (note: vocalization is different from
speech). Persistence involved repeating a gesture or lexigram use
at least two times in a row, going out of one’s way to communicate,
or maintaining a communication until responded to. Eye con-
tact involved turning the head toward or looking at a caregiver’s
face immediately before, after, or during the gesture. Vocalization
involved vocalizing at the same point in time as a communication
or immediately prior to or after it.
We also recorded for each gesture and lexigram whether the
behavior was an imitation of an immediately preceding behavior
by the caregiver.
RELIABILITY OF VIDEO CODING
Inter-rater reliability was established by calculating the per-
centage agreement, or the frequency with which both coders
made the same decision divided by the sum of agreements and
disagreements, between two independent coders for the existence,
type, and quality of gestures. This was a conservative measure-
ment of reliability because agreement on all of the behaviors that
were not instances of a given category were not taken into account.
Inter-rater reliability for each ape and the child was established on
2 h and 30 min of video for each ape and 2 h and 40 min of video
for the child across the age range sampled for the study. Percent-
age agreement was used as a reliability measurement in preference
to correlation because all coding consisted of binary (presence-
absence) judgments. Percentage agreement was used in preference
to Cohen’s kappa because we did not count agreed upon absences,
so there was no 2× 2 matrix to analyze; such a matrix is required
for the kappa statistic. Most likely these are the same reasons why
percentage agreement was used in previous research in this topic
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FIGURE 2 | Examples of a reach gesture by an ape and the
human. Reaches involve actively extending a limb toward a referent
without contacting it. Left: ape example – Sue, Panbanisha’s primary
attachment figure, has been holding Panbanisha. Someone new
(Linda) wants to hold her. Linda takes Panbanisha (1 year, 9 days) who
reaches for Sue in this frame. Linda walks away with Panbanisha who
vocalizes loudly in protest. Right: human example – Dad throws
balloon; GN (15 months, 26 days) vocalizes and reaches toward it. She
turns toward videographer, then dad. “You can go get it,” he says; and
she does.
FIGURE 3 | Examples of a reach-touch gesture sequence (reach on left
and touch on right of each pair). Reach-touch is the same as reach except
that contact is made with the referent, but only after a response from the
caregiver. Top: ape example-Carrying Panbanisha and Panpanzee, Sue says,
“Tell us where you wanna go.” Panpanzee guides Sue by taking her hand.
Then as they near car, Panbanisha (17 months, 26 days) gestures to it and Sue
walks toward it till they can touch it. “Oh you wanted to go in Steve’s car,” she
says, and they peer inside. Bottom: human example – Mom is holding GN
(11 months, 7 days) and washing something in the sink. GN reaches toward
Cheerios. Mom walks closer so GN can reach into box and get Cheerios.
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FIGURE 4 | Examples of a point gesture. Point involves extending an arm
with the index finger extended toward an object without touching it. Left: ape
example – The caregiver asks Panpanzee (22 months, 20 days) where she
wants to go and she points toward the car. They walk toward the car. Right:
human example – GN (13 months, 9 days) points at picture on fridge while
vocalizing. “What do you see?” Mom asks. “There’s GD in a picture,” Mom
continues. GN points again (not shown) and then turns to point at actual GD,
her older brother, who is out of view.
FIGURE 5 | An example of a point-touch gesture by an ape and a
human. Point-touch is a point wherein the participant ends the point by
touching the referent without moving her finger along it or manipulating it.
Left: ape example – Sue, the caregiver, and Panpanzee were walking
around Sue’s house, and Panpanzee pointed toward the picture. They
walked to it, and Panpanzee (22 months, 20 days) point-touched it. Sue
then also point-touched it and commented on the picture. Right: human
example – Mom is reading book to GN (12 months, 6 days). GN gestures
toward it, then point-touches moon in it. “Look, there’s the moon,”
says Mom.
FIGURE 6 | Examples of a head-point gesture by an ape and a
human. Head-point involves indicating an object by using one’s head.
Left – Ape example: Sue shows Panbanisha (22 months, 27 days) a chain
of keys and asks her to pick a key to open the door. Panbanisha touches
the keys with her face/head. Sue opens the door. Right – human example:
mom holds up finger puppet, saying “See it’s a baby.” She pretends to
give it a bottle. GN (14 months, 1 day) laughs and head-points it. “Yeah it’s
a baby,” Mom says.
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FIGURE 7 | Examples of an up gesture. Up involves raising the arm/arms
above the head with the implied intention of being picked up. Left: ape
example – Panbanisha climbing on car. Sue, holding Panpanzee on shoulders,
says “Panban, don’t do that.” Panbanisha (17 months, 26 days) gets down and
comes to Sue with arm raised for up. Sue puts Panpanzee down. Panpanzee
briefly shoves Panbanisha and scampers off. Then Sue picks Panbanisha up.
Right: human example – GN and Mom are playing with Lego blocks. GN
(11 months, 7 days) raises arms up. Mom helps her up.
FIGURE 8 | Examples of a go gesture by an ape and a human. Go
involves reaching and pointing when no referent is visible (even when
the camera pans to give clear view of scene). Left: ape
example – Rose is standing near a fence holding Panpanzee
(21 months, 2 days). Panpanzee gestures to go. Rose walks in the
direction gestured. Right: human example – Dad asks GN (15 months,
26 days) if she wants pasta. She says no and points go. He stands up
and says “Let’s go.”
Table 1 | Reliability: percentage agreement between two independent
coders.
Panpanzee Panbanisha Human child
Gesture/symbol existence 83 81 80
Gesture/symbol type 80 82 98
Referent 94 87 95
Eye contact 89 90 83
Vocalization 100 97 93
Persistence 87 84 90
Communicativeness 81 81 97
Agreement on communicativeness meant that both coders agreed that one of
the following indices of communicativeness was associated with the gesture:
persistence, eye contact, or vocalization.
area (e.g., Iverson et al., 1994; Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 1997;
Crais et al., 2004). See Table 1 for reliability rates for specific
gestures and individuals.
RESULTS
CROSS-SPECIES SIMILARITY IN THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF
GESTURES
The most basic finding, and one that is central to the ges-
tural theory of language evolution, is the similarity of gestures
among bonobo, chimpanzee, and human child at comparable
periods of development (see examples in the video frames pre-
sented in Figures 2–8). The following analyses included only
gestures that were not immediate imitations of caregiver behav-
iors. Binomial tests revealed that gestures were more frequently
classified as communicative (that is, associated with eye con-
tact, vocalization, or persistence) than non-communicative for
the bonobo (p< 0.0001), the chimpanzee (p< 0.0001), and the
human (p< 0.0001). See Figure 9 for the total number of
communicative and non-communicative gestures for each species.
Following Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (2005), subsequent
analyses focus on communicative gesture and symbol use, exclud-
ing from analysis behaviors that were not associated with eye
contact, vocalization, or persistence.
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FIGURE 9 | A comparison of communicative (as defined by eye contact,
vocalization, or persistence) relative to non-communicative gestures
across species.
MODES OF EXPRESSING COMMUNICATIVE INTENT ACROSS THE CLADE
Figure 10 presents the frequency with which gestures were paired
with eye contact, vocalizations, and persistence across species. The
child exhibited eye contact during 225, vocalization during 343,
and persistence during 379 of 429 communicative gestures. The
chimpanzee exhibited eye contact during 181, vocalization during
7, and persistence during 335 of 419 communicative gestures. The
bonobo exhibited eye contact during 127, vocalization during 5,
and persistence during 241 of 316 communicative gestures.
Three findings concerning the expression of communicative
intent are of particular relevance to the evolution of language:
one is that all three species use the complete array of behav-
iors that signal communicative intent: eye contact, vocalization,
and persistence (Figure 10). The second is that the largest single
difference between the human child and the apes is in the use
of vocalization to signal communicative intent (Figure 10). As
predicted, a higher proportion of the child’s communicative
gestures were paired with vocalizations, compared with either
the bonobo [χ2(1)= 445.853, p< 0.0001] or the chimpanzee
[χ2(1)= 532.697, p< 0.0001], who did not differ from each other
(p= 0.925). Contrary to predictions, a higher proportion of the
child’s communicative gestures were paired with eye contact, com-
pared with either the chimpanzee [χ2(1)= 6.901, p= 0.009] or the
bonobo: χ2(1)= 10.483, p= 0.001, who did not differ from each
other (p= 0.458).
The third important finding concerning the expression of com-
municative intent was not foreseen: the child used a much higher
proportion of multimodal expressions of communicative intent
than the apes did. 84% of the child’s communicative gestures uti-
lized more than one means of signaling communicative intent;
in contrast, only 23% of the chimpanzee’s communicative ges-
tures and 22% of the bonobo’s communicative gestures utilized
more than one means of signaling communicative intent [human
vs. chimpanzee: χ2(1)= 314.901, p< 0.0001; human vs. bonobo:
FIGURE 10 | A comparison of the use of eye contact, vocalization, or
persistence when gesturing relative to total communicative gestures
across species.
χ2(1)= 281.918, p< 0.0001; no difference between chimpanzee
and bonobo, p= 0.877].
USING GESTURE TO SCAFFOLD LEXICAL ACQUISITION
We expected to find that gestures preceded symbol use more
often than the reverse for the human child and the language-
enculturated apes. Following Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (2005),
we focused upon referents that were first referred to in one modal-
ity (gesture vs. symbol) in one session and later referred to in a
different modality during a different session. We excluded from
analysis referents first referred to by both a symbol and a gesture
during the same observation session. For the child, 10 objects or
actions were first referred to with gesture before speech while only
one was first referred to with speech. A binomial test revealed that
reference was more likely to occur first in gesture than in speech
for the child (p= 0.012). Although a qualitatively similar pattern
was observed for the language-enculturated apes, it was not sta-
tistically significant. The bonobo referred to five elements first
through gesture and one element first with a lexigram (p= 0.219).
The chimpanzee referred to three items first through gesture and
one element first with a lexigram (p= 0.625). While the same qual-
itative pattern of symbols appearing first in gesture and only later
in speech was observed across species, this pattern was statistically
significant only for the child.
We also hypothesized that all three species would exhibit a shift
from greater reliance on gestures to greater reliance on symbols
(words for the child, lexigrams for the apes) with increasing age.
In order to ensure that a varied range of contexts were represented
when assessing patterns of communicative development, we com-
pared the frequency of gesture and symbol use during the first
half of the study to the frequency of gesture and symbol use dur-
ing the second half of the study. Thus, we compared observations
from the first 7 months of the study to observations from the last
7 months of the study for the apes and observations from the first
4 months of the study to observations from the last 4 months for
the child. Because there were an uneven number of data points
for the apes, data from their 19th month of age, the middle data
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FIGURE 11 | A cross-species comparison of the frequency of
communicative gestures relative to symbols during the first and the
second half of the study. (The bonobo produced two lexigrams in the first
7 months of the study, but, because of the necessary scale of the graphs to
capture high frequency categories, they are not visible in the right-hand
panel.)
point, was excluded from analysis. Analyses focus on frequency of
use rather than the number of referents referred to within a given
modality.
Between 11 and 14 months of age, GN, the child, produced
211 communicative gestures and 23 words during observation
sessions. Between 15 and 18 months of age, she produced an
average of 219 communicative gestures and 513 words dur-
ing observation sessions (Figure 11). A Fisher’s test revealed
that the proportion of words relative to gestures increased sig-
nificantly with age for the child (p< 0.0001). Between 12 and
18 months of age, Panpanzee, the chimpanzee, produced 165 com-
municative gestures and no lexigrams during observation sessions.
Between 20 and 26 months of age, she produced 234 commu-
nicative gestures and 52 lexigrams during observation sessions
(Figure 11). A Fisher’s test revealed that the proportion of sym-
bols relative to gestures increased significantly with age for the
chimpanzee (p< 0.0001). Between 12 and 18 months of age, Pan-
banisha, the bonobo, produced 103 communicative gestures and 2
lexigrams during observation sessions. Between 20 and 26 months
of age she produced 188 communicative gestures and 32 lex-
igrams during observation sessions (see Figure 11.) A Fisher’s
test revealed that the proportion of symbols relative to gestures
increased significantly with age for the bonobo (p= 0.0002). Thus,
increasing reliance on symbols relative to gestures was observed
across the course of the study, regardless of species. From a com-
mon base of communicative gestures, all three species developed
symbols.
REACHING, POINTING, AND SHOWING
Given that children indicate more, whereas language-enculturated
apes request more on the symbolic level, we expected language-
enculturated apes to exhibit a greater proportion of reaches relative
to points when compared to a human toddler of a similar age. We
focused upon canonical examples of communicative reaching and
pointing and excluded from analysis head-points, point-touches,
and reach-touches.
Visual inspection of the frequency of different communica-
tion types across the clade (depicted in Figure 12) suggests that
the child used more symbols (as expected from the compara-
tive developmental analysis in Figure 11) and pointing than the
apes, whereas the apes used more reaching gestures. In order to
capture the referential function of gestures, points and reaches
used to indicate specific entities are depicted separately from
points and reaches coded as “go” in Figure 12. However, because
we did not have specific hypotheses about gestures depicting
actions vs. entities, gestures with the same form are reported
together in the following analyses irrespective of their referential
function.
The child produced 138 points and 151 reaches over the course
of the study. The bonobo produced 11 points and 271 reaches.
The chimpanzee produced 17 points and 358 reaches. Fisher’s
tests revealed that the child produced a higher proportion of
points relative to reaches than the bonobo (p< 0.0001) and the
chimpanzee (p< 0.0001). Given research suggesting that older
language-enculturated apes exhibit more pointing than young
infants and the overall increase in gestural frequency with age
in the current study (Figure 11), the current findings suggest
that language-enculturated apes may continue to develop the
frequency with which they point after early childhood.
Exploring the idea that only human children are motivated
to share experience for its own sake, we also compared the fre-
quency of showing gestures in child, chimpanzee, and bonobo.
In support of the idea that showing something to another may
be uniquely human, the child was the only one to use a show-
ing gesture – although the showing gesture was still not very
frequent.
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FIGURE 12 | A comparison of types of communicative
gestures/symbols across species. Head-point is classified as other
due to its infrequency. (The chimpanzee and bonobo each produced
one point-go and one other gesture, but because of the necessary
scale of the graphs to capture high frequency categories, they are not
visible.)
DISCUSSION
The current study, with its unique naturalistic video database for
a young chimpanzee, bonobo, and human child, provides sup-
port for the role of gesture in language evolution. At the most
basic level, we see a functional and formal similarity in gesture
in all three species, with a young bonobo, chimpanzee, and child
all at comparable periods of communicative development. Ges-
tures served a communicative function across species in that they
were usually paired with evidence of communicative intent. Sim-
ilar types of gestures were also observed across species. According
to the logic of cladistic analysis, these shared gestural capacities
were likely present before the divergence of the three species five
or six million years ago. Acknowledging the likelihood of gesture as
a biological capacity in the clade’s common ancestor, it is nonethe-
less impossible to know to what extent and how it was actualized in
behavior at that time. Still, given that human language, as we now
know it, had not yet evolved at that time, this is one line of evidence
for the gestural foundation of human language evolution.
GESTURE PRECEDES SYMBOLS ACROSS SPECIES
The ontogenetic precedence of gesture before symbol across the
clade provides another line of evidence for the gestural theory of
language evolution. The frequency of symbol relative to gesture
use increased with development across the clade. While phylogeny
does not repeat ontogeny, it is the case that later stages of develop-
ment cannot evolve without the ontogenetic foundation of earlier
stages already being present (Parker and McKinney, 1999). There-
fore, later stages of ontogenetic development tend also to evolve
later.
RELIANCE ON GESTURE DECREASES FOR HUMANS BUT NOT APES
However, there was also evidence of the phylogenetic divergence
of humans and apes in the domain of communication. Symbols
(in the form of words) became more frequent than gestures in the
child’s later observations, whereas gestures remained more fre-
quent than symbols (in the form of lexigrams) for the chimpanzee
and bonobo throughout the study period. While the same qual-
itative pattern of reference being first achieved through gesture
and only later through symbols was observed across the clade, this
pattern was statistically significant only for the human partici-
pant. These developmental patterns are in line with the subsequent
evolution of complex language in Homo but not Pan.
Like atypically developing humans communicating with typi-
cally developing humans, apes may face communicative barriers
when trying to communicate with humans that they would not
face when communicating with other apes. Findings from atypi-
cal human developmental trajectories suggest that developmental
changes in gesture relative to symbol use may depend upon the
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match between individuals and communicative modalities. While
most human children move from more gestures to more words
with development, blind children do not exhibit this pattern (Iver-
son and Goldin-Meadow, 1997). Similarly, Caselli and Volterra
(1990) found that between 10 and 11 months of age, both a hear-
ing and a deaf toddler had equal numbers of words and gestures.
Between 15 and 16 months, the speaking child’s gestural lexicon
froze while the deaf child’s continued to expand.
Given limitations of the lexigram system devised to help apes
communicate with us, compared with the flexibility of human
speech, gestures may be a better match than symbols for apes
but not humans. Unlike human speech, lexigram boards are not
always available and have a constrained number of possible refer-
ents (a maximum of 256). Thus, a combination of gestures and
symbols may confer some of the referential flexibility to language-
enculturated apes that speech comes to provide to humans with
development.
However, differences between the human and the apes in the
observed frequency with which items transitioned from gesture
to speech may also be attributable to the greater variety of con-
texts in which ape communication was observed relative to the
human child; this greater variety of contexts greatly reduced the
occurrence of the same referent across time, making the sample
size too small to attain statistical significance. The human partici-
pant was assessed in a constant home environment, similar to that
used by Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (2005) except that she was
also observed occasionally in a contained backyard. In contrast,
the apes were observed in their home, but also while exploring the
surrounding forest. This forest contained many paths, landmarks,
and potential destinations. Each destination contained a particu-
lar type of treat, such as a specific food that was often not available
when foraging on other paths. The child in our study was therefore
much more likely to encounter the same referents across multiple
observations than were the ape participants. In order for reference
to be observed transferring across modalities, future cross-species
comparisons might benefit by constraining the number of possi-
ble referents and ensuring that similar referents are available across
multiple sessions.
It is also important to note that the distinction between ges-
tures and symbols made for the purposes of the current study is
somewhat arbitrary (see Kendon, 2000; Capirci and Volterra, 2008;
for a discussion of this). Notably, use of the lexigram board nec-
essarily involves gesture. Gestures also continue to play a role in
human communication across development, although their role
and the frequency with which different gestures are used changes
(Capirci and Volterra, 2008). Rather than being supplanted by
speech, gesture may have co-evolved with speech (Corballis, 2002).
SPECIES DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES IN EVIDENCE OF
COMMUNICATIVE INTENT
It is important to note that all three species of the clade used ges-
ture communicatively and that all three species exhibited the same
set of markers of communicative intent: eye gaze, vocalization,
and persistence. Cladistic analysis suggests that these markers of
communicative intent in the gestural modality were present in
our common ancestor five to six million years ago. The combina-
tion of gesture and vocalization may have particular importance
in language origins (Cartmill and Maestripieri, 2012) – given the
existence of gesture-speech synchrony in human adults (McNeill,
1992) and gesture-vocalization synchrony in 2- and 3-months-old
human infants (Fogel and Hannan, 1985). Future research should
determine if other measures of communicative intent that were
not assessed in the current study, such as tactile contact, occur
equally frequently across species.
In line with our hypothesis, the human child more frequently
paired gestures with vocalization than the apes. This association
of gesture and vocalization, as well as the existence of gestures
unique to the child (e.g., nodding, waving), constitute additional
evidence suggesting the co-evolution of gesture and speech after
the evolutionary divergence of the hominid line five to six million
years ago.
Contrary to our hypothesis, and to previous comparisons of
older apes to human children (Leavens and Hopkins, 1999), the
human child more frequently paired eye contact with gestures than
the apes did. However, closer analysis showed that this was because
the child more frequently accompanied a single gesture with more
than one marker of communicative intent than the apes did. This
multimodal expression of communicative intent, normative for
the child but less common for the apes, suggests strengthening of
the use of multiple modalities to express communicative intent
after the divergence of the hominid line.
SPECIES DIFFERENCES IN TYPES OF GESTURES
The human child produced a far greater number of pointing ges-
tures than did the apes; in contrast, the apes produced a greater
number of reaching gestures than did the child. Only the human
child produced showing gestures. Together these findings provide
gestural evidence that ape communication is more instrumen-
tal than that of human children; in contrast, children gear their
communication more to the sharing of experience with another
(Tomasello, 2006). These gestural findings concerning pointing
and reaching replicate the species-comparative pattern found on
the symbolic level (Lyn et al., 2011).
However, we must not forget that both pointing and reaching
were present in all species, in the same way that both declarative
and imperative symbol productions are present later in devel-
opment of the same apes, as well as two human children (Lyn
et al., 2011). Thus, across the clade, the development of sym-
bols builds on the pattern of communicative functions that are
present earlier in ontogeny in the gestural mode. As with markers
of communicative intent, the array of gesture types, likely present
in the clade’s common ancestry, provided the building blocks upon
which natural selection could work, making more adaptive traits
more frequent as phylogenetic development proceeded – perhaps
increasing the relative frequency of declaration in the human line
as an enhanced stepping stone to human language. We can even
conceptualize showing, unique to the human child, as a further
evolutionary development growing out of declarative pointing as
its ontogenetic foundation (Camaioni, 1997).
The finding that the human child pointed more relative to
reaching than the apes is again contrary to previous comparisons
of older language-enculturated apes and human infants (Leav-
ens and Hopkins, 1999). Differences between the current findings
and those with older language-enculturated apes suggest that it is
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important to take developmental stage into consideration when
comparing across species and that changes in the frequency of
pointing and eye contact may emerge across development among
language-enculturated apes. The importance of taking a life-span
approach to cross-species comparisons of symbolic development
should not be underestimated.
LIMITATIONS
When comparing development across three species, it is difficult
to equate the species in terms of developmental level as skills are
likely to develop at variable rates across species. Having more rep-
resentatives of each species could increase our understanding of
normative measures of development in each species and allow us
to compare developmental stages across species more effectively.
Additionally, a greater number of representatives of each species
would allow us to disentangle species and individual differences.
Reliability between coders was substantially higher for some of
the coding decisions (particularly for type of communication and
for whether or not it was communicative) for the human child
than it was for the apes. Nonetheless, inter-rater reliability reached
acceptable standards for every species. These differences in coding
reliability between the human child and the apes could be due to
poorer video quality for the ape data and to difficulty on the part
of human coders in coding ape gestures.
While lexigrams share a number of important similarities
with words, such as an arbitrary correspondence between sym-
bol and referent, they also have key differences. For example, ideas
expressed in lexigrams do not always have a one-to-one correspon-
dence to ideas expressed with words. For example, the lexigram
“Sue’s-gate” is a single lexigram that could mean either a land-
mark or a more complex relation between a gate and a person.
However, given that the semantic complexity of symbols was not
our object of study, this difference should not have affected our
results.
A more important difference between lexigrams and words is
that lexigrams could be coded only when interpreted by a human
caregiver or glossed by a machine while human speech needed
only to be responded to in order to be coded. We did not code
the number of lexigrams that were neither interpreted nor glossed
and thus excluded from analyses. However, given that each ape was
typically paired with a single caregiver who was intent on encour-
aging and capturing all of the ape’s communicative attempts, it
is likely that only a small proportion of the apes’ lexigram use
went unrecorded in the current analyses. In any case, it is likely
that a small proportion of the child’s verbal communications were
not responded to, so it is possible that there was no difference in
selectivity between ape and child communication.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Future research should also examine the emergence of imperative
(requests for something to be granted) or declarative (attempts
to cause another to see what one sees: Bates et al., 1975) ges-
tures across species. Although indication for declarative purposes
is rarely reported in apes, it is more common and varied for
language-enculturated apes (Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh,
1990; Brakke and Savage-Rumbaugh,1996; Krause,1997; Lyn et al.,
2011).
In order to better investigate ontogenetic and phylogenetic
relations between gesture and speech, future cross-species com-
parisons should distinguish between dyadic and triadic gestures
as well as between deictic, iconic (or picture-like), and representa-
tional gestures. Dyadic gestures, referring to another, may be more
developed in apes than triadic gestures, referring to objects. Even
within triadic gestures, it is possible that apes use them to refer to
other living beings more, while children in industrial societies use
them to refer more to inanimate objects.
With respect to action gestures, Tanner and Byrne (1996) sug-
gested that the ancestors of humanity probably communicated
through iconic gestures about actions rather than objects because
apes often focus on actions when gesturing. Indeed, compar-
isons of sign language produced by two deaf children and two
language-trained gorillas demonstrated that while their early lex-
icons were similar in composition, more of the gorillas’ first signs
depicted iconic actions than the children’s (Bonvillian and Pat-
terson, 1993). It would be intriguing to examine developmental
changes in types of gestures across species in order to investi-
gate the relative importance of iconic relative to deictic gestures
for symbolic development. Future research should also examine
the relative frequency of imitated gestures and gestures denot-
ing objects, actions, or other living beings across species in order
to evaluate the theory that imitative gestures, or gestures denot-
ing actions, may have been particularly important for language
development (Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998).
CONCLUSION
What does this study tell us about the relationship between sym-
bols and gestures? It provides evidence of a phylogenetic and
ontogenetic transition from gesture to symbol. At the same time, it
provides new evidence for the co-evolution of gesture and speech.
The study documents clear similarities and differences in the
ontogeny of communication of a chimpanzee, a bonobo, and a
human child. The similarities provide insights into shared poten-
tial which could have helped our ancestors develop language from
gesture. Differences suggest ways that humans may have diverged
from other members of the clade in their communicative devel-
opment, and provide evidence for the co-evolution of gesture and
speech.
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